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Summary
Dominant individuals report high levels of self-sufficiency,
self-esteem, and authoritarianism. The lay stereotype sug-
gests that such individuals ignore information from others,
preferring to make their own choices. However, the non-
human animal literature presents a conflicting view, suggest-
ing that dominant individuals are avid social learners,
whereas subordinates focus on learning from private experi-
ence. Whether dominant humans are best characterized by
the lay stereotype or the animal view is currently unknown.
Here, we present a ‘‘social dominance paradox’’: using self-
report scales and computerized tasks, we demonstrate that
socially dominant people explicitly value independence,
but, paradoxically, in a complex decision-making task, they
show an enhanced reliance (relative to subordinate individ-
uals) on social learning. More specifically, socially dominant
people employed a strategy of copying other agents when
the agents’ responses had a history of being correct. How-
ever, in humans, two subtypes of dominance have been iden-
tified [1]: aggressive and social. Aggressively dominant
individuals, who are as likely to ‘‘get their own way’’ as so-
cially dominant individuals but who do so through the use
of aggressive or Machiavellian tactics, did not use social in-
formation, even when it was beneficial to do so. This paper
presents the first study of dominance and social learning in
humans and challenges the lay stereotype in which all domi-
nant individuals ignore others’ views [2]. The more subtle
perspective we offer could have important implications for
decision making in both the boardroom and the classroom.
Results and Discussion
In experiment 1, adult participants (n = 33; age mean = 27.88,
SEM = 1.39; 19 males, 14 females; Table S1 available online)
completed subjective rating scales of social dominance (SD)
and aggressive dominance (AD) [1, 3] (see Supp. Exp. Proc.
1 in Supplemental Experimental Procedures) and a computer-
ized decision-making task [4] that enabled separate investiga-
tion of individual and social learning [4] (Figure 1). Validation
studies [1] have demonstrated that individuals who score
high in either SD or AD, on the scales we employed, have
strong beliefs about the importance of individual account-
ability and self-report high levels of self-esteem, authoritari-
anism, and self-sufficiency [1]. In a real-life social interaction,
wherein participants work in groups to select a hypothetical
new housemate, high SD and AD individuals excel in influ-
encing the group’s choice according to their personal pre-
ferences. However, analysis of video recordings of such*Correspondence: jennifer.cook@donders.ru.nlinteractions demonstrates significant differences in the
methods employed: whereas SDs tend to rely on reasoning
to persuade others, ADs use aggression and Machiavellian
tactics such as threat, deceit, and flattery [1].
In the decision-making task, participants scored points by
using individually experienced (outcome history) and/or social
(Figure 1, red frame) information to make choices between a
blue and a green stimulus. In each trial, a red frame surrounded
one of the two stimuli. Participants were instructed that this
frame (the social information) represented the most popular
choice made by a group of four participants who had com-
pleted the task previously. The actual probability of reward
associated with the blue and green boxes and the probability
that the red frame surrounded the correct box varied according
to uncorrelated pseudorandom schedules (Figure 2; Supp.
Exp. Proc. 2 in Supplemental Experimental Procedures). A
Bayesian learnermodel algorithm [4, 5] was employed to create
two models of optimal performance (Figure 2): the individual
learner model and the social learner model. The individual
learner model comprised the probability, based on the out-
come history, that a blue choice would be rewarded. Thus,
for each trial, its value represented the reward probability asso-
ciated with a blue choice that a participant would have derived
if they had been learning, in an optimal fashion, exclusively
from private information about reward outcomes (i.e., ignoring
the social information). The social learner model comprised the
probability, based on the social information weighted by the
history of correct social information, that the group’s choice
would be rewarded. From this model, we computed, for each
trial, the reward probability of a blue choice that a participant
would have derived if they had been learning, in an optimal
fashion, exclusively from the social information (i.e., ignoring
individual experience). Using logistic regression, we regressed
these two models against participants’ choices. This resulted
in individual and social beta values (regression slopes) that
represent the degree to which choices were explained by the
two respective models. A participant whose choices were
strongly influenced by the social information (reflected in the
social learner model) would have a high social beta value,
and a participant who consistently went against the social in-
formation would have a negative social beta value.
Multiple regression models applied at the group level
showed that SD (t(32) = 2.08, p = 0.048, standardized b
[stdb] = 0.39) was a significant positive predictor of the social
beta values: the higher a participant scored in SD, the more
they used the social information, as estimated by the social
learner model, to make their choices (Figure 3; Figure S1;
see Supp. Exp. Proc. 3 in Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures for replication study). In contrast, AD was a significant
negative predictor of social betas (t(32) = 22.74, p = 0.01,
stdb = 20.49): the higher a participant scored in AD, the less
likely they were to use the social information to make their
choices. Notably, there was no correlation between SD and
AD (r = 0.21, p = 0.24). Fisher’s r-to-z transformation (Table
S2) confirmed that the relationship between SD and the use
of social information was significantly different from the rela-
tionship between AD and the use of social information (z =
3.57, p = 0.0002). By regressing dominance scores against
mean number of correct responses, we also found that
aggressive (t(32) =22.27, p = 0.03, stdb =20.41), but not social
(t(32) = 20.11, p = 0.91, stdb = 20.02), dominance was
Figure 1. Task Flow Diagram
In the decision task, participants were required to select between a blue and
green box in order to win points. In each trial, participants first saw a cue
screen for between 1 s and 4 s. Then, either the blue or the green box was
highlighted with a red frame. Participants were instructed that this frame
represented either the most popular choice made by a group of four partic-
ipants who had completed the task previously (experiment 1) or the choice
from a computer-simulated roulette wheel (experiment 2). After 0.5–2 s, a
question mark appeared, indicating that the participant could make their
response. Immediately after participants had responded, their selected op-
tion was framed in gray. A further 0.5–2 s interval ensued, after which partic-
ipants received feedback in the form of a green or blue box in the middle of
the screen. If participants were successful, the red reward bar progressed
toward the silver and gold goals. The probability of reward associated
with the blue and green boxes and the probability that the red frame sur-
rounded the correct box varied according to uncorrelated pseudorandom
schedules (Figure 2; Supp. Exp. Proc. 2 in Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Note that in the above figure, red, blue, and green have been
replaced with white, gray stripes, and gray checks. ISI, interstimulus inter-
val; ITI, intertrial interval.
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2813predictive of poor overall performance. Neither social (t(32) =
20.45, p = 0.66, stdb = 20.11) nor aggressive (t(32) = 0.71,
p = 0.49, stdb = 0.16) dominance predicted individual learning
betas, and both SD and ADwere significantly better predictors
of social learning than of individual learning (SD: Fisher’s r-to-
z = 1.9, p = 0.03; AD: Fisher’s r-to-z = 22.57, p = 0.01).
Together, these results suggest that whereas responses
from socially dominant individuals followed those of the group,
responses from aggressively dominant individuals did not.
This neglect of social information had a detrimental effect on
the AD individuals’ overall task performance.
The link between SD and social learning concurs with find-
ings concerning other social animals (e.g., bird and primate
species) in which dominant individuals tend to be social
learners, whereas subordinates tend to rely on individual
learning [6, 7]. Modeling in economics and behavioral ecology
has shown that whereas individual learning can be slow, risky,
and costly in energetic terms, these pitfalls can be avoided
by social learning. However, if all group members learn onlysocially, the group’s wisdom can diverge from reality [7, 8].
Thus, a division of labor, in which highly socially dominant in-
dividuals favor social learning and subordinate individuals are
dedicated individual learners, may serve to optimize knowl-
edge acquisition at the group level.
In the current task, there are a number of ways that the social
information can be used to one’s advantage: (1) one could
identify when the information is predominantly correct and
copy the group’s responses (matching), (2) one could identify
when the information is predominantly incorrect and select
the nonrecommended option (nonmatching), or (3) optimally,
one could use both of these strategies. Notably, matching
and nonmatching are equal in utility, but only nonmatching in-
volves actively going against the group’s choice. To investi-
gatewhich strategywas driving the effect of SD,we conducted
a further analysis that separated trials in which the social infor-
mation was predominantly correct (p [red frame = correct] >
0.5, with probabilities derived from the social learner model)
from those in which it was predominantly incorrect (p [red
frame = correct] < 0.5). This analysis showed that SDwas a sig-
nificant predictor of the use of predominantly correct (t(32) =
2.86, p = 0.01, stdb = 0.56, partial r = 0.50), but not predomi-
nantly incorrect (t(32) = 0.25, p = 0.81, stdb = 0.05, partial r =
0.05), social information (see Supp. Exp. Proc. 4a in Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures for replication study). SD
was a better predictor of the use of predominantly correct
than incorrect information (Fisher’s r-to-z = 1.93, p = 0.05;
see Supp. Exp. Proc. 4b in Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures for AD analysis). These results indicate that the superior
performance of SD individuals was based primarily on their
tendency to match, rather than to nonmatch, social informa-
tion—to copy other agents when the other agents’ responses
were correct, rather than to choose the alternative when the
agents’ responses were incorrect. Given that matching and
nonmatching would have been equally effective in scoring
points and that copying is known to promote cooperative
behavior [9], this suggests that SDs may use social learning
to serve not only instrumental and epistemic functions but
also interpersonal functions, such as the promotion of positive
social attitudes between informant and learner.
In nonhuman primates, subordination has been associated
with suboptimal dopamine system function [10, 11]. Given
that dopamine has been linked to general learning processes,
as opposed to specifically social learning processes [12–14],
this raises an important question for our study: does the effect
of dominance generalize to learning from any indirect source
of information? To find out, we ran a second experiment in
which the procedure and data analysis were identical, but par-
ticipants were told that the red frame represented the ‘‘choice’’
of a computer program simulating roulette wheels rather than
choices made by other agents. Participants were informed
that the roulette wheels could fluctuate between selecting pre-
dominantly correct and predominantly incorrect choices
(Supp. Exp. Proc. 2 and Supp. Exp. Proc. 5 in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). In this group (n = 34; age mean =
26.21, SEM = 0.96; 19 males, 15 females; Table S1), the effect
of the red frame was unrelated to social (t(33) = 0.42, p = 0.68,
stdb = 0.09) or aggressive (t(33) = 20.78, p = 0.94, stdb =
20.01) dominance (see Supp. Exp. Proc. 6 in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for further analysis). These data
suggest that the effects of indirect information on choice in
experiment 1 depended on the participants believing that the
red frame represented the behavior of other agents, i.e., social
information.
Figure 2. Social and Individual Bayesian Learner
Models
To create the social (dashed gray line) and indi-
vidual (dashed black line) learner models, trial
outcomes and social information were used as
inputs to a Bayesian learner model algorithm.
The model generated estimates (dashed lines)
of the underlying probability (solid lines) that
blue was rewarded (bottom) and that the social
information was useful (top). The illustrated
example concerns randomization Group 1 (see
Supp. Exp. Proc. 2 in Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for randomization details).
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dominance paradox’’: socially dominant individuals, who are
typically characterized as having strong beliefs about the
importance of individual accountability, and who highly value
their own opinions and abilities [1], are nonetheless more likely
than low SD individuals to rely on social information and to
copy others. However, thus far, aside from referring to previous
literature, we have provided no direct evidence that SD individ-
uals explicitly value individual accountability. To investigate
whether this is indeed the case, we ran a third experiment in
which 34 participants (age mean = 23.38, SEM = 0.81) com-
pleted the SD subscale and a novel task. This task estimated
the value that participants assigned to individual (private) and
social information by requiring them to pay for this information
(Figure 4). The aim of experiment 3 was to index spontaneousindividual differences in the ‘‘baseline’’
values attributed to social and private
information; thus, in contrast to experi-
ments 1 and 2, there was no clear
optimal strategy because this might
bias social and/or private information
valuation. SD (mean = 3.77, SEM =
0.17) was positively correlated with the
value attributed to individual (Pearson’s
r = 0.40, p = 0.02, significant at Bonfer-
roni-corrected a of 0.025), but not social(r = 0.21, p = 0.25), information (Figure S2). Thus, the results of
experiment 3 confirm the existence of a social dominance
paradox: when asked to make explicit judgments, socially
dominant individuals assign a high value to private information,
but when they are in the thick of a complex decision-making
task, they make extensive use of social information.
In sum, we found that socially dominant people explicitly
value independence (experiment 3) but show an enhanced reli-
ance, relative to subordinate individuals, on social learning
when in a complex decision-making situation (experiment 1).
In our decision-making task, fruitful strategies for utilizing
the social information flipped between matching and actively
nonmatching the group’s choice. SD individuals utilized a
matching, but not a nonmatching, strategy and employed
this strategy only when the red frame represented social, notFigure 3. Dominance and Learning Beta Correla-
tions
Y axes show social (experiment 1) or roulette
(experiment 2) learning betas; x axes show social
dominance or aggressive dominance. Whereas
social dominance was significantly positively
associated with social learning betas, aggressive
dominancewas not. Neither of the forms of domi-
nance were predictive of roulette learning betas.
See also Figure S1.
Figure 4. Subjective Valuation Task
The aim was to guess whether a hidden picture was a face, house, car, or
scene. Each correct guess earned 100 credits. The task comprised two
phases: a selection phase and a guessing phase. In the selection phase,
participants were presented with a 15 3 15 grid, one box of which was
missing to reveal part of a hidden picture. Participants then decided
whether to complete the subsequent guessing phase with just one box
missing or pay credits to have five additional boxes removed in the guessing
phase. In the Individual information condition, the additional boxes were
selected by the participants themselves, and in the Social information con-
dition, they were selected by previous participants. Credit stores started at
0, and participants were informed that credits spent in the selection phase
would be deducted from profits from the guessing phase. Each condition
comprised six levels varying in the cost of additional information (0, 15,
30, 45, 60, or 75 credits). There were 5 trials per pay level and thus 30 trials
per condition. In the guessing phase, the boxes selected in the selection
phase were removed, and participants indicated whether the hidden picture
was a face, house, car, or scene.
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dency to match. In contrast, people who are aggressively
dominant did not show a bias toward social learning.
Although much is known about the population-level func-
tions of social learning [15], very few studies have investigated
the individual-level psychological mechanisms (C.M.H. and J.
Pearce, unpublished data) or attempted to explain why people
vary widely in their susceptibility to social influence [16–18].
The current series of experiments begins to parse this interin-
dividual variability using a personality-psychology approach
and shows, for the first time, that dominance is an important
factor. These data challenge the lay stereotype that all domi-
nant individuals ignore the views of others [2]. Themore subtle
perspective offered by our findings may aid the development
of interventions, which maximize learning within organizations




In experiment 1, participants completed subjective rating scales [1, 3] of SD
and AD, strength of social support network [19], and socioeconomic status
(SES) [20], enabling us to investigate the relationship between dominance
and learning while controlling for social support and SES.Subsequently, participants completed the computerized decision-making
task [4]. Correct choices were rewarded with points represented on a bar
spanning the bottom of the screen. Participants’ aim was to obtain a silver
(£2) or gold (£4) reward. Before participants made their choice, a red frame
appeared that represented the most popular choice from two males and
two females who had completed the task previously. Participants were
informed that previous attempts had been ‘‘juggled’’ such that ‘‘in some
phases, they won’t seem very useful—for example, they could be guesses
from the very beginning of the task when they had little experience. In other
phases, however, they will seem quite useful—for example, responses from
later in the taskwhen they had had the opportunity to practice a bit more.’’ In
animal studies of dominance and social learning, subjects typically observe
and do not compete with models [6, 7]. Therefore, to maintain consistency
between the animal and human literatures, our cover story avoided the intro-
duction of a one-on-one competitive context (e.g., Behrens et al. [4]).
The study was conducted in accordance with the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki (local ethics committee code: PSYETH[UPTD] 12/13 59).
Data Analysis
Using a Bayesian learner model [5], we computed the individual learner
model by integrating the observed choices and outcomes [5], estimating
the underlying trial-by-trial probability that blue was rewarded. The social
learner model was estimated from the observed veracity of the advice in
each trial. Here, the model generates estimates, which were used to weight
the group’s choice, of the underlying probability that the social information
was correct. Binomial logistic regression was used to estimate the degree
to which both models explained each participant’s choices, resulting in an
individual and social learning beta for each participant.
To investigate whether dominance was predictive of learning strategy, we
used individual and social betas as dependent variables in two separate
regressionmodels. Both models comprised two predictor variables of inter-
est (SD and AD) and five predictors of no interest (age, gender, randomiza-
tion, social support, and SES). See Supp. Exp. Proc. 7 in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for normality tests.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures, two figures, and two tables and can be found with this article online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.10.014.
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